Sweden Won’t Meet Turkey Demands To Win Its Vote On NATO Membership Authored by Yves Smith via NakedCapitalism.com, Ooh, things are getting to be fun! Nothing like watching geopolitical jousting out in the open. Here, we have the US (and NATO) attempting to push around TΓΌrkiye, a country that holds far too many cards to meekly accept Western dictates. The immediate contratemps that has just heated up is TΓΌrkiyeβs threat to block Swedenβs bid to join NATO, which any NATO member can bar. TΓΌrkiye demanded that Sweden stop supporting what TΓΌrkiye deems to be Kurdish terrorists and made specific requests, including extraditions. It seemed highly unlikely that Sweden would be willing to accede to all of TΓΌrkiyeβs demands, and Sweden just said so: Conventional wisdom is that TΓΌrkiye will eventually knuckle under and will waive Finland and Sweden in. It would be too monstrously embarrassing and would worsen rifts in the bloc otherwise. But TΓΌrkiye will need some sort of bribe to go along. And is has to be visible for the sake of Erdogan depicting that he go something in return for his partial climbdown on his Kurdish terrorist position. But what might that sweetener be? If you were to read only, say, the likes of the Economist, youβd have the strong impression that TΓΌrkiye was a vassal state that doesnβt know its place. For those of you new to this plot line,Β NATO offered super duper expedited membership to Sweden and Finland.Β NATO acted as if the two Nordic states would be voted in quickly. TΓΌrkiye almost as quickly said it would refuse to accept their application, but backed right before an end-of-June NATO meeting.Β From the Guardian: After a period of intensive negotiations, Jens Stoltenberg, Natoβs secretary general, said on Tuesday evening: βI am pleased to announce that we now have an agreement that paves the way for Finland and Sweden to join Nato.β βTurkey, Finland and Sweden have signed a memorandum that addresses Turkeyβs concerns, including around arms exports and the fight against terrorism,β he addedβ¦. [Swedish Prime Minister Magdelena] Andersson said she had shown the Turkish leader changes in Swedenβs terrorism legislation set to come into force next month. βAnd of course, we will continue our fight against terrorism and as Nato members also do so with closer cooperation with Turkey,β the Swedish premier said. NATO and EU leaders acted as if everything was settled. But voting on accepting the application and voting to approve membership are two different matters. TΓΌrkiye and Hungary have not yet approved the Sweden/Finland ascension (Hungaryβs is allegedly because its Parliament hasnβt gotten to it yet, but some commentators contend pro-Russian officials are throwing sand in the gears). Erdogan held back TΓΌrkiyeβs approval for Sweden because he wanted to see performance on Swedenβs commitments. One of Edoganβs asks that Sweden agreed to, which at the time struck me as something Sweden either would or could not deliver on, was the extradition of specific individuals.Β From EUObserver: Turkey has demanded Sweden extradite 33 Kurdish separatists and people linked to βFETΓβ β Ankaraβs name for followers of Fethullah GΓΌlen, a US-based Muslim leader, whom ErdoΔan blames for organising a failed coup in 2016. Sweden has so far extradited two. In fact, Sweden had signaled that it was unlikely to comply much if at all with the extradition part of the deal. Again from EUObserver: βThe Swedish government must comply with Swedish and international law in extradition matters, which is also made clear in the trilateral agreement,β Sweden said, referring to a three-way accord on Nato enlargement with Finland and Turkey. The agreement to secure TΓΌrkiyeβs vote for Sweden blew up over the attempt to extradite a publisher who is part of Fethullah GΓΌlen and Erdogan sees as an important figure in the coup attempt against him.Β From Associated Press: Swedenβs top court on Monday rejected an extradition request for a man wanted by Turkey, saying the Scandinavian country does not criminalize the act he is accused of committing. In a statement, the Swedish Supreme Court said there were βobstacles to extradition because it is a matter of so-called political crimes, i.e. crimes that are directed against the state and that are political in nature.β The court in Stockholm said there was βa risk of persecution based on the personβs political viewsβ if he were returned to Turkey. The court did not name the man who was the subject of Turkeyβs request. Swedish news agency TT identified him as Bulent Kenes and said the Turkish government wants him in connection with a 2016 coup attempt. Erdogan has made clear that Kenes was a priority. Again from Associated Press: Erdogan singled Kenes out last month during a joint news conference with the Swedish prime minister in Ankara. βThere is one member of the (Gulen) terrorist organization in Sweden, whose name I will give: Bulent Kenes,β Erdogan said. βFor example, the deportation of this terrorist to Turkey is of great importance to us, and we of course want Sweden to act with more sensitivity (on the issue).β And in a development that doesnβt seem to have gotten much notice in the press, Erdogan raised his demands after the Kenes ruling. FromΒ the Stockholm Center for Freedom, four days after the Supreme Court ruling: Turkish authorities have expanded the list of people, the majority of them political dissidents, whose extradition is demanded from Sweden, increasing the number from 33 to 42, Turkish Minute reported, citing Radio Sweden. Sweden and Finland broke with decades of military non-alignment and applied to join NATO in response to Russiaβs February invasion of Ukraine. Turkey and Hungary are the only NATO members yet to ratify the Nordic neighborsβ applications. Turkey has accused Finland and Sweden, in particular, of providing a safe haven for outlawed Kurdish groups it deems βterroristsβ as well as some political dissidents and has refrained from ratifying their NATO bids despite an agreement in Madrid in June. According to Radio Sweden, the Turkish governmentβs list of people whose extradition is demanded from Sweden includes 16 alleged members of the outlawed Kurdistan Workersβ Party (PKK), 12 people with alleged links to the faith-based GΓΌlen movement and seven people from leftist groups in addition to seven people who are accused of such crimes as smuggling. Oddly, the article does not point out that the PKK is a recognized terrorist organization;Β the US put PKK on its list the same day it added Hezbollah and Shining Path.Β One would assume extraditing them plus the accused smugglers would be viable.1 However, Sweden said it is done with catering to TΓΌrkiye to get its NATO vote. From the Financial Times: Sweden has said Turkey is demanding concessions that Stockholm cannot give to approve its application to join Nato as the prime minister insisted the country had done all it could to meet Ankaraβs concerns. Ulf Kristersson, the new centre-right leader, on Sunday threw down the gauntlet to Turkey in the clearest indication yet from Stockholm that it could do no more to help persuade Turkey to drop its opposition to Sweden and neighbouring Finland joining the western military alliance. βTurkey confirms that we have done what we said we would do. But they also say that they want things that we canβt and wonβt give them. So the decision is now with Turkey,β Kristersson told a Swedish defence conference. Sweden is rubbing salt in TΓΌrkiyeβs wound by misrepresenting what its Foreign Minister said. From Reuters inΒ Turkey calls for more action from Sweden on extradition for NATO backing, three days after the Supreme Court ruling that blocked Kenesβ extradition: [Foreign Minister Mevlut] Cavusoglu said Turkey appreciated Swedenβs steps so far. βHowever, there is no concrete development regarding the extradition of terrorism-related criminals and the freezing of their assets,β he saidβ¦. βIf Sweden wants to be a NATO ally, we have to see concrete cooperation. The negotiations are carried out in a positive atmosphere, but the denial of extradition of Kenes has intoxicated this atmosphere,β Cavusoglu said at the press meet. In other words, TΓΌrkiye clearly reminded Sweden that it had not delivered on its commitments. TΓΌrkiye reminded Sweden that it needed to follow through to get TΓΌrkiyeβs NATO vote. But Sweden is now trying to present TΓΌrkiye as somehow having come around to Swedenβs position. Where is the counter-offer? At a minimum, it sure looks like 23 people were good candidates for extradition. Using a high-profile single case as a basis for dropping the entire matter looks like bad faith. After all, 2/3 of the attempts so far had succeeded. This is a very long winded introduction to a key point, that TΓΌrkiye has tons of leverage and therefore has and will continue to play the Collective West off against the rest of the world. The only way that stops would be if NATO manages to do an own goal on the order of the anti-Russia economic sanctions and gets TΓΌrkiye to hike out of NATO. Thereβs no process for removing a NATO member2Β TΓΌrkiye very very much likes the advantage it gets against Russia by being in NATO, so it is extremely unlikely that TΓΌrkiye would depart of its own accord. So TΓΌrkiye in NATO looks increasingly like those old pre-nup marriages, where both parties really would like to be done with each other but canβt afford to get divorced.3Β TΓΌrkiyeβs assets include: The Dardanelles Second biggest NATO army, and the biggest in the European theater: Incirlik Air Base. This is the airbase the US uses for Middle Eastern operations. And reflecting TΓΌrkiyeβs position, itβs not run on normal US-as-occupier airbase lines. FromΒ MilitaryBases.com: The base is in Turkey, which means that it is operated by both the US and the Turkish governments, unlike other co-bases. Most other military installations are operated by the US government, but under the regulation of the hosting government. Incirlik has held (as of 2016) and may still hold as many as 50 hydrogen warheads. Things started to go very pear shaped with the US after the 2016 coup attempt. Aljazeera gives a very good overview. Erdogan is very unhappy that the US has refused to extradite Fethullah Gulen. While TΓΌrkiye apparently has not come up with strong enough evidence of Gulenβs personal involvement, itβs not hard to see that a Muslim cleric in the normally not very Muslim-friendly US having a very lavish compound would generate suspicion back home. This is far from a complete list of dust-ups since then: Calls in 2016 for TΓΌrkiye to be expelled from NATO due toΒ its ouster of Gulen alliesΒ (mind you, the purge had started in 2013 but intensified greatly after the coup attempt) TΓΌrkiye ordering Russian S-400 air-defense systems, now twice, leading the US to cancel F-35 sales to TΓΌrkiye.4Β That might seem like a gift except TΓΌrkiye is listed as a funder of the program, which at a minimum means having invested in factories to make some parts. Note that TΓΌrkiye signed the deal in 2017. The US cut TΓΌrkiye out of the F-35 program the month after TΓΌrkiye accepted the first delivery, in 2019. The Trump Administration imposed additional sanctions on TΓΌrkiye in December 2020. The afore-alluded-to 2019 fury when TΓΌrkiye launched Operation Spring, against Kurdish (as in American-backed) forces in Syria. Erdogan poured gas on the fire by threatening to stop barring Syrian refugees from entering Europe if he wasnβt allowed to have his way. TΓΌrkiye making some of the right noises about Russiaβs conflict in Ukraine but still maintaining and even expanding relations with Russia. Ankara has been explicit: Ukraine and Russia are neighbors and it intends to stay on good terms with both. TΓΌrkiye did supply Ukraine with much-touted Bayrakter dronesβ¦.that wound up big time underperforming. And as weβll flesh out a bit more below, the Collective West regards TΓΌrkiye as not doing its part to support the war against Russia. However, TΓΌrkiye entered into a big economic deal with Russia. The West has tried to block some elements, such as TΓΌrkiye banks accepting the Mir card. TΓΌrkiye and Russia expect to have work-arounds in place by summer 2023. The West also canβt be happy at the prospect of Syria and TΓΌrkiye teaming up, with Russia helping to broker the deal, to go against βterroristsβ which will include pretty much all of the US catβs paws. On the TΓΌrkiye side, I suspect but canβt prove that one of the reasons for its tart opposition to the Sweden/Finland membership offers was that it was not consulted in advance. Today,Β Conor Gallagher provides an important, long-form treatment of a development that TΓΌrkiye regards in and of itself as a huge betrayal: the US working with Greece to place missiles on Aegean islands that by treaty were pledged to stay unarmed. The US rationale is that TΓΌrkiye has not been an aggressive enough NATO operative, for instance, in its refusal to let warships enter the Black Sea, and more generally, declining to operate as a US/NATO hub in the war, so it is using Greece to get at Moscow. But TΓΌrkiye has repeatedly complained that it is also in Greek crosshairs, and Conor and other analysts believe the US moves are meant toΒ punishΒ pressure TΓΌrkiye. Erdogan has reacted in his typical very impolitic manner, leading to further harrumphing that his words prove heβs not a fit member of civilized society.Β From the Express in mid-December: Speaking during a town hall meeting with youths in the northern Turkish city of Samsun on Saturday, Erdogan said Turkey had begun making its own short-range ballistic missiles called Tayfun, which, he said, was βfrightening the Greeks.β β(The Greeks) say βIt can hit Athensβ,β said Erdogan, whose comments were aired late Sunday. He added: βOf course it will. If you donβt stay calm, if you try to buy things from the United States and other places (to arm) the islands, a country like Turkey β¦ has to do something.β Letβs return to the headline issue: will this TΓΌrkiye threat over Sweden just prove to be a show of bluster, as most of the press has been treating it (as well as NATO itself, which has been inviting Sweden and Finland to meetings and extending other privileges normally afforded only to members)? In light of all of the above, that may not be such a safe bet. TΓΌrkiye, interestingly like India, has been trying to navigated a geopolitically independent, self-interested course. But India is not a key member of a US dominated security alliance. It is hard to calibrate TΓΌrkiye messaging compared to its intent. If TΓΌrkiye regards the arming of Greece as a serious security threat, which seems likely, it is logical to assume that TΓΌrkiye will continue to withhold its approval of Sweden and Finland until the US winds that program back at least to a degree. Itβs a clear leverage point on a matter to which the West has hopelessly committed itself.5 However, the US has likely convinced itself that using Greece to mount a joint threat against Russia and TΓΌrkiye is strategically necessary. And since it is becoming hard to paper over that the Ukraine war is not going well (witness, for instance the recent Washington Post op-ed by Condoleeza Rice and Robert Gates,Β Time is not on Ukraineβs side), the US is likely to engage in displacement: since it isnβt getting what it wants in Ukraine, it is going to make damned sure it gets what it wants elsewhere. That means NATO expansion among other things. The odds appear high that the US would regard TΓΌrkiye as intransigent and at a time when it feels it canβt afford even an optical setback, as in further delay in getting the Nordic nations in NATO. But instead of giving TΓΌrkiye a sweetener, the US and NATO have been big on sticks. So I would expect things to get worse before they get better on this front. And they may not get better. Tyler Durden Tue, 01/10/2023 – 02:00
Sweden Won’t Meet Turkey Demands To Win Its Vote On NATO Membership
Advertisment




